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I. INTRODUCTION
In a reoccurring fashion,1 the nondelegation doctrine was left in
constitutional exile yet again as a fractured Supreme Court ruled against a
nondelegation challenge in Gundy v. United States.2 The nondelegation
doctrine is a constitutional principle that prohibits Congress from
conferring its legislative power to another branch of government.3 Any
elementary school student can tell you that the legislature “makes the law,”
the executive “enforces the law,” and the judiciary “interprets the law.”4
Nevertheless, in modern times, Congress has delegated much of its authority
to write rules and regulations, with the effect of law, to administrative
agencies within the Executive Branch.5 The Court has only used the
1. For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s ruling against challenges to an unconstitutional
delegation of power, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748 (1996); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989) (holding there was no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
2. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
3. Id. at 2121.
4. Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Justice in Support of Reversal at 1, Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2684384 [hereinafter Brief for the Institute for Justice].
5. See Aditya Bamzai, Comment, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the
Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164 (2019) [hereinafter Bamzai, Delegation
and Interpretive Discretion] (discussing the Congressional authority delegated to administrative agencies).
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nondelegation doctrine twice, both in 1935, to strike down an act of
Congress as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority6—leading
to an eighty-five-year hiatus for the doctrine. Its absence has left many to
declare the doctrine as dead-letter law.7 Though the nondelegation doctrine
remains in exile, perhaps the Gundy concurrence and dissent has at least
cracked open the door and invited future nondelegation challenges.8 The
issue certainly drew strong support calling for a revival of the doctrine,9
likely bolstered by support when the decision came down. Gundy has caused
many to wonder what the future may hold for the nondelegation doctrine.10
There is no doubt this case will help shape the future of administrative law
in the United States.
Part I of this paper identifies the constitutional basis for the
nondelegation doctrine.
It discusses constitutional rationales and
influences, which helped the founders shape America’s constitutional order.
The history of the nondelegation doctrine is traced from its origin to the
intelligible principle’s current standard while evaluating its treatment by the
6. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (holding the
provision at issue was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and thus violated the
nondelegation doctrine); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (striking down the
provision at issue because it went beyond the “limits of delegation”).
7. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV. 1035,
1038 (2007) [hereinafter Alexander & Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot]; Andrew Coan & Nicholas
Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 780 (2016); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001); Alexander Volokh, The New Private Regulation
Skepticism Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 974
(2014) (all declaring the nondelegation doctrine is essentially nonexistent).
8. John Yoo & James C. Phillips, With Kavanaugh, the Court Should Tame the Administrative State,
NAT’L REV. (Oct. 25, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/10/supreme-courtbrett-kavanaugh-administrative-state/ [https://perma.cc/T46A-PGF9] (discussing how the Court’s
decision in Gundy is likely to generate many nondelegation cases as parties challenge delegations that
seem similarly broad or broader than the challenged provision in Gundy); Evan Zoldan, Gundy v.
United States: A Peek Into the Future of Government Regulation, HILL (June 21, 2019, 12:24 PM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/449687-gundy-v-united-states-a-peek-into-the-future-of-gover
nment-regulation [https://perma.cc/BXW9-GS4K].
9. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioner at 5–9,
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2684381; Brief of William D.
Araiza et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17–6086),
2018 WL 2733950; Brief for the Cato Institute and Cause of Action Institute as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 2–5, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2412171; Brief Institute for
Justice, supra note 4, at 27–29, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2684384; Brief for the
Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20–22, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116
(No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2684377 [hereinafter Brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation].
10. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116 (upholding the provision of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA or the Act) because it did not violate the nondelegation doctrine).
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courts. Part II discusses the recent case of Gundy v. United States and the
impassioned dissent by Justice Gorsuch, which may help shape the future
of administrative law.
The appointment of federal judges by
President Trump has changed the federal judicial landscape, thereby
increasing the possibility of a revived nondelegation doctrine. Part III seeks
to identify the tension, if any, between the nondelegation doctrine and
rulemaking procedures placed on federal agencies in part by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Lastly, Part IV will identify how a
revived nondelegation doctrine may diminish the importance of the APA.
Before taking an in-depth look into the Gundy opinion and possible postGundy effects by the federal judiciary, it is vital to first understand the
nondelegation doctrine’s historical roots and foundation.
A. Constitutional Principles and the Nondelegation Doctrine
“The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of
powers that underlies our tripartite system of government.”11 Article I of
the Constitution established that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”12 Articles II and III
share similar clauses vesting executive power in a President of the United
States13 and judicial power in one Supreme Court and inferior courts.14
The United States is a government of enumerated powers, and each branch
of government can only exercise the powers granted to it;15 “[t]hus the
Constitution recognizes distinct grants of governmental power that can be
categorized as either legislative, executive, or judicial . . . .16 Though there
is no explicit provision in the Constitution enumerating a commitment to
the separation of powers, such a commitment is evident through
constitutional structure, text, and provisions.17
A government modeled on the separation of powers is not an American
invention, as it has long served as a defense against tyranny before America’s

11. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
13. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
14. Id. art. III, § 1.
15. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
16. Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 379, 388 (2017) [hereinafter Whittington & Iuliano, Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine].
17. See id. at 388–89 (suggesting Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution implicitly acknowledge
the separation of powers principle).
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founding.18 John Locke, who strongly influenced the framers of the
Constitution, once declared:
The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it
being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it
over to others. . . . And when the people have said, We will submit to rules,
and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, [nobody] else
can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by
any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and
authorized to make laws for them.19

This notion is embodied in the Constitution as the governed chose to vest
Congress with the authority to make all legislative decisions.20
The framers constructed a government of separate powers because they
recognized the culmination of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in
the same hands is the “very definition of tyranny.”21 This government
structure was insisted upon to ensure the people’s liberty would not be
unduly restricted as separation of powers is viewed as an essential element
of a free government.22 The co-equal branches of government are to serve
as a check on each other.23 The Constitution’s design seeks to hold the
government accountable to the People and secure the blessings of liberty.24
Nondelegation is a principal ratified by “We the People” in an effort “to
form a more perfect Union.”25 It serves as the very foundation of
government from which the United States grew and prospered. When
separate powers begin to co-mingle, protections breakdown and liberty is
threatened.26 The controversial issue is not whether the nondelegation

18. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996); see generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297
(2003) [hereinafter Alexander & Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated] (discussing how the nondelegation doctrine dates back three centuries).
19. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 74–75 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690) (emphasis added).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 308 (James Madison) (The Project Gutenburg ed., 2013).
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 316–18 (James Madison) (The Project Gutenburg ed., 2013).
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 333−34 (James Madison) (The Project Gutenburg ed., 2013).
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 308.
25. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
26. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 314 (James Madison) (equating tyranny to
“an accumulation of all powers . . . , in the same hands”).
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doctrine should exist.27 It is more than likely most people agree that
separation of powers to prevent tyranny and suppression of liberty is a good
thing. Rather, the issue is the test the Supreme Court should use to
determine whether a delegation is a constitutionally permissible grant of
power from the legislative branch.28
II. NONDELEGATION IN THE COURTS
A. Pre-Intelligible Principle
The Court first addressed a nondelegation challenge during the Jefferson
administration, but the Court did not elaborate greatly on the issue.29 A
short time later, the Court recognized the first nondelegation principle in
Wayman v. Southard,30 from which the doctrine would grow. The Wayman
Court considered a challenge to a delegation by Congress to the federal
judiciary, which granted rulemaking power to the courts for determining
judicial procedure.31 The Court held the statute did not impermissibly grant
the judiciary legislative power as Congress provided the controlling general
policy that courts should follow when establishing procedural rules.32 In
the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that “the maker of the law
may commit something to the discretion of the other departments” while
noting that it is a “delicate and difficult inquiry” to differentiate between
permissible and impermissible delegations of power.33
Though the Court only provided vague boundaries for permissible
delegation, it recognized that the legislature may enact a statute with general
provisions, and those acting pursuant to the general provisions may “fill up
27. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2119 (2019) (explaining the delegation of power
provision found in the Constitution).
28. Id.
29. The challenge against the Non-Intercourse Act was designed to prevent the U.S. from taking
sides between Britain and France. The Act allowed the president to lift the embargo against either
country if either recognized the U.S.’s neutral commerce rights. An owner of a cargo ship challenged
the Act as an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive. The Court did not
specifically address the delegation challenge, but the opinion suggests the president was simply a factfinder. See Cargo of the Brig. Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 382–85 (1813) (declining
to address whether the act created potential problems of excessive delegation).
30. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
31. See id. at 19 (describing how the Process Act allowed Federal courts to adopt state court
procedural rules which the court could make “alterations and additions” to).
32. Id. at 20 (rejecting defense counsel’s argument that the clause would unconstitutionally
confer legislative authority to the courts).
33. Id. at 22.
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the details.”34 The Court emphasized that Congress may never delegate
power strictly and exclusively within Congress’s Article I enumerated grants
of power.35
By the end of the 19th century, the Court was more willing to draw a line
between permissible and impermissible delegations in Marshall Field & Co.
v. Clark.36 In Field, the petitioner claimed Congress unconstitutionally
delegated power to the president by allowing him to initiate or suspend
reciprocal tariffs on certain goods.37 The Field Court was more explicit than
the Wayman Court in stating the principle of the nondelegation doctrine:
“[t]hat [C]ongress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a
principle recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system
of government ordained by the [C]onstitution.”38 However, the Act did
not vest the president with the power of legislation because Congress
determined the provisions of the Act and prescribed the duties to be levied,
collected, and paid; the president only served as a fact-finder to determine
when the Act of Congress should be enforced.39 While the Court held it
permissible to allow Congress to prescribe rules and apply the rules
dependent on executive fact-finding, it would be several decades before the
modern nondelegation standard took control of nondelegation
jurisprudence.
B. Rise of the Intelligible Principle
As the Progressive Era brought about administrative expansion, the
desire for agency expediency saw the Court characterize almost any
delegation of power as non-legislative.40 As the administrative state steadily
grew, it was a challenge to the president’s ability to adjust custom duties to
34. Id. at 20.
35. See id. at 20 (“It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any
other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative”).
36. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
37. The Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 authorized the President to initiate or suspend tariffs on
sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and animal hides after a finding that a foreign nation imposed tariffs on
these goods produced in America. Id. at 680. The Court recognized that Congress frequently deferred
to the President when setting standards for trade and commerce and that such routine deference was
entitled to greater weight when determining if it was an impermissible delegation of authority. Id.
at 682.
38. Id. at 692.
39. See id. at 692–94 (explaining the Act, in effect, made the president a “mere agent of the lawmaking department,” as he was only required to “ascertain and declare the event which its expressed
will was to take effect”).
40. Whittington & Iuliano, Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 16, at 399.
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import barium dioxide, which produced the modern “intelligible principle
test.”41
In Hampton,42 a delegation challenge arose after Congress enabled the
president to adjust tariffs on imported goods under a flexible tariff
provision, which sought to equalize production costs between the United
States and foreign countries.43 The Court upheld the delegation by
reasoning that Congress would be unable to properly regulate tariffs without
the Tariff Commission and the president.44
In the opinion,
Chief Justice Taft attempted to provide a clear standard by which to judge
legislative delegations that became the basis for the doctrine today: “If
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”45
Chief Justice Taft reiterated that Congress may never transfer legislative
power to the president, as that breaches fundamental law, but Congress may
seek assistance from another branch so long as the co-ordinate branches do
not assume the others’ constitutional duties.46 The executive did not
exercise the power of legislation “because nothing involving the expediency
or just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the
[p]resident.”47 The president acted as a mere agent of the legislature tasked
to declare when Congress’s expressed will would take effect.48 Following
Hampton, the intelligible principle was put to the test as the United States
experienced significant social, economic, and political change brought on by
the Great Depression.49

41. The legal test most often used to apply the nondelegation doctrine was first established in
the early 20th century. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
(“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation
of legislative power.”).
42. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
43. See id. at 400–02 (describing how Congress mandated that the United States Tariff
Commission investigate the trading conditions on behalf of the president, who would then make the
final decision based on the Commission’s finding).
44. Id. at 404–05.
45. Id. at 409.
46. Id. at 406.
47. Id. at 409.
48. Id. at 410.
49. See Andrew Ziaja, Hot Oil and Hot Air: The Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine Through the
New Deal, a History, 1813–1944, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 942 (2008) [hereinafter Ziaja, Hot Oil
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C. Intelligible Principle in Action
For years after Hampton, the intelligible principle never defeated an act of
Congress—until 1935, that is.50 During the New Deal, Congress enacted
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA), a broad-reaching
statute that empowered the executive to create new administrative agencies
to regulate significant portions of the U.S. economy to rebuild it.51
Acting under the authority of Section 9(c) of NIRA, President Roosevelt
issued executive orders prohibiting interstate trade of petroleum oil
extracted in excess of state quotas52 and authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to exercise all powers vested in the presidency to enforce the first
order.53 In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,54 the Supreme Court was tasked
with determining whether the authority Congress intended the President to
exercise under NIRA, concerning, permitting, or prohibiting flows of oil,
violated the nondelegation doctrine.55 The Court first examined
Section 9(c), the provision in question. The section authorized the
President to stop the flow of oil in interstate or foreign commerce when the
amount of oil exceeded the amount permitted by any state or state agency.56
The Court stated:
Section 9(c) [did] not state whether or in what circumstances or under what
conditions, the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of
petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the state’s
permission. . . . It [did] not require any finding by the President as a condition
of his action. . . . So far as this section is concerned, it [gave] the President an

and Hot Air] (discussing how the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA) delegated immense
regulatory power to the president).
50. See Martin Edwards, Who’s Exercising What Power: Toward a Judicially-Manageable Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 69−70 (2016) (describing how the Court ruled Section 9(c) of NIRA
violated the nondelegation doctrine for lack of intelligible principle).
51. Id. at 69; Ziaja, Hot Oil and Hot Air, supra note 49, at 942.
52. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405–06 (1935).
53. See id. at 407 (explaining the punishment for violating the prohibition on the interstate
transport of oil drawn in excess of state quotas was a fine up to $500, up to six months in prison, or
both).
54. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
55. See id. at 414–15 (“[W]e look to the statute to see whether the Congress has declared a policy
with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a standard for the President’s action;
whether the Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact
prohibition.”).
56. Id. at 406.
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unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition,
or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.57

The Court found that the President acted according to his own judgment
in deciding whether to permit or prohibit the flow of oil, rather than per
guidance promulgated by Congress.58 The problem with Section 9(c) was
that Congress neglected to include conditions or guideposts under which
the President could control the distribution of petroleum.59 Though
finding this section violated the nondelegation doctrine, the Court reiterated
that the Constitution grants Congress the flexibility needed to lay policies
and establish standards.60
Several months later, NIRA faced a second loss after the Court struck
down another provision of the statute in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States.61 Section 3 of NIRA allowed trade and industrial associations
to develop codes of fair competition, and with the President’s approval, the
code would become binding law.62 When the code was presented to the
President for his approval, he did not have to accept or reject it in toto.
Instead, the President could impose conditions, provide exemptions, and
create exceptions to provisions of the code that he deemed necessary—all
of which created binding law.63
Acting under section 3, President Roosevelt issued an executive order
creating the “Live Poultry Code” (the Code), which regulated the chain of
sale from raising to slaughtering chickens.64 A person’s failure to comply
with the Code was punishable by fines.65 In Schechter, the Court was tasked
57. Id. at 415.
58. Id. at 418–19.
59. See id. at 415 (describing Section 9(c) as “brief and unambiguous” as it declared no policy
regarding the transportation of excess petroleum, and “it g[ave] the President unlimited authority to
determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition”).
60. Id. at 421.
61. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
62. Id. at 522–23 (stating a code would be approved “if the President [found] (1) that such
associations or groups ‘impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are
truly representative,’ and (2) that such codes are not designed ‘to promote monopolies or to eliminate
or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to
effectuate the policy’ of title I of the act.” (citation omitted)).
63. Id. at 523.
64. Id. at 523–24.
65. See id. (noting the Code only covered a section of the Northeast including New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut). The Code regulated various aspects of the poultry industry including
employee rights, minimum wage, and minimum work age. Id. at 521–22. Violation of the Code was a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $500 for each offense. Id. at 523.
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with determining whether the President’s authority in establishing the Code
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.66 In analyzing the
question, the Court evaluated the limits that Section 3 placed on the exercise
of presidential power.67 The Court found that Section 3 of NIRA supplied
“no standards for any trade, industry or activity.”68 Section 3 allowed the
President unfettered authority to undertake the legislative act of approving
and proscribing code that regulated trade and industry in the country.69 As
such, the Court held the President’s code-making authority was an
unconstitutional act that created “delegation running riot.”70
The Court has not invoked the nondelegation doctrine since Schechter.
Subsequently, the intelligible principle that Congress must provide is
satisfied so long as it “delineates the general policy” for an agency to apply.71
The intelligible principle standard is seemingly very broad as the Court
afforded Congress flexibility to delegate power to administrative agencies to
implement statutes that were characterized as “fair and equitable,”72 “just
and reasonable,”73 or “in the public interest.”74 All of which are
comprehensive general policy directives that can be construed in a number
of ways.
Like the Wayman Court, the modern Court strongly recognizes that
nondelegation is fundamental to the constitutional system, but it remains
difficult to apply.75 The Court hesitates and does not readily invoke the
66. The Schechters were indicted and convicted on eighteen counts under the Live Poultry
Code. Id. at 519. It was on appeal that they challenged the act as an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. Id. at 527–28.
67. Id. at 535, 538.
68. Id. at 541.
69. Id. at 541–42.
70. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
71. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
72. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419–20 (1944) (allowing Congress to delegate
authority under the Emergency Price Control Act to regulate commodity prices and control inflation
during wartime).
73. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (allowing Congress
to delegate authority to the Federal Power Commission to set rates for natural gas).
74. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943) (allowing Congress to
delegate authority to the Federal Communications Commission to establish regulations for radio
stations engaged in chain broadcasting).
75. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the
nondelegation doctrine is not “readily enforceable by the courts”); see also Steven F. Huefner, The
Supreme Court’s Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than “A Dime’s
Worth of Difference”, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 337, 415–16 (2000) [hereinafter Huefner, A Dime’s Difference]
(discussing the Supreme Court’s avoidance of using the nondelegation doctrine); Peter H. Schuck,
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nondelegation doctrine as it has “never felt qualified to second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law.”76 As the Court’s centuries-old
struggle to draw the line between permissible and impermissible delegation
continues, it should come as no surprise that the success rate of
nondelegation challenges in federal courts is virtually nonexistent.
D. Success Rate of Nondelegation Challenges
Though the Supreme Court has not employed the intelligible principle
test of nondelegation to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional for several
decades, leaving many to declare the doctrine as dead and gone, some argue
the doctrine is alive and well—particularly in state courts.77 State courts are
by far the most popular venue for nondelegation challenges as they heard
85% of all the nondelegation challenges in the post-New Deal era.78 When
aggregated together, state and federal court nondelegation challenges
succeed 15% of the time between 1940 and 2015.79 This rate is comparable
to the 17% success rate of nondelegation challenges from 1789 to 1939, the
pre-intelligible principle era.80 Such similar rates do not comport with the
notion that the doctrine is dead. However, when examining the success rate
for nondelegation challenges in federal courts over time, the contrast is
striking.81
Between 1940 and 2015, only 3% of the 156 nondelegation challenges in
federal courts were initially successful in invalidating federal action as an

Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 791 (1999) (stating
the Court’s “line-drawing problem[]” has caused the Court not to implement a “robust nondelegation
doctrine”).
76. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. The authors compiled a database of state and federal nondelegation cases decided in a year
divisible by five between 1940 and 2015 to create a representative sample of nondelegation cases postNew Deal. See Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619, 635−36 (2017) [hereinafter Iuliano & Washington, The Nondelegation
Doctrine: Alive and Well] (finding the large majority of nondelegation cases during this time frame took
place in state courts).
78. Id. at 636.
79. Id. at 635−36.
80. Id. at 636.
81. Compare Whittington & Iuliano, Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 16, at 426 (noting
the invalidation rate of nondelegation challenges in federal courts after 1880), with Iuliano &
Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, supra note 77, at 636 (noting the invalidation rate
of nondelegation challenges in federal courts between 1940 and 2015).
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unconstitutional delegation of power.82 However, four of the five initially
successful cases were reversed on appeal—leaving an actual success rate of
0.6%.83 Meanwhile, the challenges to nondelegation in state courts
maintained a comparable invalidation rate of 17% and 16%, respectively,
during those time frames.84
An important distinction must be noted between federal and state
nondelegation doctrine practice. Unlike the U.S. Constitution’s inherent
nondelegation principle, most state constitutions enumerate a specific
nondelegation principle.85 By enumerating such provisions in their
constitutions, states make their commitment to the separation of powers
clear86 and provide a valuable tool for judicial review.87 Since state
constitutions contain nondelegation clauses in much greater detail than the
U.S. Constitution, it is no surprise that state courts seldom cite the
Constitution when discussing the nondelegation doctrine.88
While sharing the same spirit for protecting liberty by preventing tyranny,
federal and state nondelegation doctrines are the same in name only, which
is why there is a more robust application of the doctrine in state courts. The
federal nondelegation doctrine’s inherent nature and uncodified case law
mandate may provide part of the reason why the doctrine is not active in
the federal courts.
As the People’s agents in Congress, the Constitution presupposes that
congresspeople will exercise the legislative will independently, but the
principle of nondelegation has never been understood to create a substantial

82. Iuliano & Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, supra note 77, at 636.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be
divided into three distinct departments . . . and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of
these departments, shall exercise any powers properly attached to either of the others . . . .”); S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (“In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of
the government shall be forever separate and distinct for each other, and no person or persons
exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.”).
86. Aside from creating a clear emphasis that state government is a system of separation of
powers, many provisions in state constitutions forbid the passage of law contingent on any outside
authority. Whittington & Iuliano, Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 16, at 416 (citing IND.
CONST. art. I, § 25). Similarly, many state constitutions contain provisions explicitly forbidding the
legislature to delegate any powers. Id. (referencing COLO. CONST. art. V, § 35).
87. Nevertheless, even with strong textual support preventing broad swaths of delegation, state
courts are often still willing to defer to the legislature in determining when delegation is practical and
necessary. Id. at 417.
88. Id.
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burden for Congress.89 The federal legislature undoubtedly will come
across issues that are impracticable for it to answer without turning to a
body of experts to fill up the policy details.90 Therefore, the issue of
permissible congressional delegation turns into a question of degree.91 In
Herman Gundy’s mind, Congress went a degree too far when it delegated
authority to the U.S. Attorney General in deciding how a legislative act
would apply to pre-act offenders.92
III. GUNDY V. UNITED STATES AND A FEVERISH DISSENT
A. The Plurality Holding
In Gundy, the Court ruled against Herman Gundy in a 4–1–3 plurality
opinion.93 In 2006, Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA or the Act), which established a national,
comprehensive sex offender registration system.94 The Act imposes
criminal penalties on convicted sex offenders who knowingly fail to register
89. Id.
90. See St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 211 (1902) (noting there would be
no objection to delegating law-making power to experts in the field of mining for specific issues).
91. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (2019).
93. Justice Kagan announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion which
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Alito concurred only in the judgment.
Justice Gorsuch dissented with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 2116. Many
commentators have ridiculed plurality opinions as nothing more than “juridical cripples.” See generally
Linda Novak, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 760
(1980) (citing John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme
Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59 (1968). But behind the alleged juridical cripple is perhaps the greatest benefit
of plurality opinions—judicial freedom and flexibility. Id. at 66. Pluralities provide greater judicial
freedom because a Justice need not limit his views to obtain majority support; therefore, a Justice is
free to engage in a creative analysis to tackle a divisive or undecided issue knowing that his attempt to
create innovative views will not be binding on lower courts. Id.
Not only do pluralities provide Justices with more freedom, but they also allow greater freedom
to the lower courts because they allow the judges the chance to distinguish future cases instead of
always following strict precedent. Id. at 62. Such freedom among the Justices and judges aid in the
sound development of the law by allowing individual positions to be well articulated instead of forcing
a compromised agreement. Plurality opinions are often well written, coherent, and thoughtful
explanations of the Justice’s rationale to clarify the issue and convince others to respect and follow his
position. As discussion increases with multiple rationales proposed, the law develops as jurists may
coalesce around a specific proposition or train of thought. See generally id. (discussing the precedential
value of plurality opinions for the Supreme Court)).
94. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (2019) (referencing Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–91).
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and who travel in interstate commerce.95 While Congress detailed
registration requirements for sex offenders convicted after the Act’s
passage, it left the U.S. Attorney General the discretion to “specify the
applicability” of the Act’s requirements to sex offenders convicted before
its passage.96 The provision states:
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of
the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the
enactment of this chapter . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration of any
such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable
to comply with subsection (b).97

Acting under his delegated authority, the then-Attorney General issued a
final ruling in 2010 mandating SORNA’s registration requirements applied
in full to pre-Act offenders.98 In 2005, Petitioner Gundy pleaded guilty
under Maryland law to sexually assaulting a minor; thereafter, Gundy was
released from prison in 2012 and moved to New York.99 Gundy never
registered as a sex offender and was subsequently convicted under SORNA
for not satisfying the registration requirement.100
Gundy challenged his conviction, in part, as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to the Attorney General by allowing him
to decide how SORNA’s registration requirements would apply to pre-Act
offenders.101 He challenged the provision as granting “unguided” and
“unchecked” power to the Attorney General.102 In determining if the Act
provided an intelligible principle, the inquiry began with statutory
interpretation to ascertain the statute’s meaning to determine if executive
discretion is sufficiently guided.103 Only after the Court determined the
meaning of the challenged provision could it decide whether the discretion
95. Sex offenders who fail to register can be imprisoned for up to ten years. Id. at 2121
(citing Failure to Register, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)).
96. Id. at 2122 (quoting Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d)).
97. Id. (quoting Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d)).
98. The Court refers to sex offenders who were convicted before SORNA’s passage as
“pre-Act offenders.” Id. (quoting Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81849,
81850 (Dec. 29, 2010)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2123 (“[The provision] does not give the Attorney General anything like the
‘unguided’ and ‘unchecked’ authority that Gundy says.”).
103. Id. (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001)).
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allowed was constitutional.104 The plurality states that a fundamental canon
of construction is to read the statute’s words in context within the overall
statutory scheme.105 When tasked with a nondelegation challenge, the
Court gives “narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might
otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”106 Moreover, the Court
often looks beyond the context and towards the statute’s history and
purpose to further determine the meaning of the language.107
The plurality determined section 20913(d) “require[d] the Attorney
General to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible.”108
Justice Kagan found the court properly determined the provision’s statutory
meaning seven years earlier in Reynolds v. United States,109 which “effectively
resolved” the issue before the Gundy court.110 The Court’s holistic
endeavor of statutory interpretation began with SORNA’s declaration of
purpose to create a comprehensive national sex offender database.111
According to the plurality, the term “comprehensive,”112 “could not fit the
system SORNA created if the Attorney General could decline, for any
reason or no reason at all, to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders.”113
Furthermore, the plurality contends that the Act’s definition of sex
104. Id. at 2129.
105. Id. at 2126 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666
(2007)).
106. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (citing Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336,
342 (1974)).
107. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2126 (2019) (citing Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 78 (2013)).
108. Id. at 2123 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 442–43 (2012)).
109. See Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 442 (2012) (noting SORNA’s broad definition
of “sex offender” “include[s] any ‘individual who was convicted of a sex offense.’”).
110. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124. In Reynolds, the Court determined whether the SORNA
registration requirements applied to pre-Act offenders once the law was enacted by Congress or if the
requirements did not apply until the Attorney General said they did. Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 437.
The Court settled on the latter approach and held SORNA did not apply to pre-Act offenders until
the Attorney General mandated the requirements apply. Id. at 435. In part, the Court reasoned that
an instantaneous registration mandate for pre-Act offenders might not have been feasible, as the
registration requirements largely diverged from state law. See id. at 440–41 (discussing the feasibility of
automatically applying SORNA registration requirements to pre-Act offenders). To resolve difficulties,
the Court determined Congress assigned to the Department of Justice the responsibility examine the
issues and apply the registration requirements accordingly (i.e., as soon as feasible). Id. at 441.
111. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124 (noting Reynolds presumed it was Congress’s intent for “SORNA’s
registration requirements to apply to pre-Act offenders.”).
112. The Court defined comprehensive to mean “something that is all encompassing or
sweeping.” Id. at 2126–27.
113. Id. at 2127.
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offender—“an individual who was convicted of a sex offense”—uses past
tense language, meaning the Act does not apply just to future offenders.114
Justice Kagan found such construction of the words were supported by the
legislative history as the need to register those convicted of sexual assault
was a prime issue for Congress.115
Turning to back to Section 20913(d), when read as a whole, the text
created a practical problem for Congress to apply the Act to pre-Act
offenders because the Act assumed that offenders were in prison when, in
fact, pre-Act offenders were not.”116 Justice Kagan identified this problem
as meaning SORNA required the Attorney General to resolve practical
problems of registering pre-Act offenders by determining how to apply
SORNA as opposed to whether to apply it to pre-Act offenders at all.117
The contentions resulted in the plurality’s finding the “text, . . . context,
purpose, and history, makes clear that the Attorney General’s discretion
extends only to considering and addressing feasibility issues.”118 In
addressing the feasibility issues of the Act, the Attorney General is only
determining administrative issues, and therefore, the Act is within
constitutional bounds of delegation.119 Yet again, the Court found the
federal agency just determined the “how” element of a policy enacted by
Congress: “Congress [can still] routinely [delegate] its legislative power, even
though the doctrine pretends it does not.”120 The tradition continues.
Gundy marked yet another moment in the Court’s nondelegation history
where rationally minded individuals greatly differed as to the preferred
outcome of the case. As expected, staunch opposition from other members
of the Court met the plurality’s opinion.121
B. An Invitation to Litigate?
The plurality’s ruling securing a judgment against Gundy received support
from Justice Alito’s concurrence.122 Nevertheless, Justice Alito noted his
discontent with how the Court has allowed agencies to promulgate rules
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2128.
Id. at 2128–29.
Id. at 2123–24.
Id. at 2129–30.
Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 361 (2017).
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131.
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 7

658

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:641

“pursuant to extraordinarily [capricious] standards.”123 Furthermore,
Justice Alito signaled his support for the Court’s revisiting and possibly
Though
revising their nondelegation approach in the future.124
Justice Alito thought it would be “freakish” 125 to revisit the nondelegation
approach with the Gundy case, at least three of his colleagues thought the
time was right.126
C. The Gorsuch Dissent
Justice Gorsuch strongly dissented to the plurality’s holding.127 He
criticized the plurality as having reimagined SORNA’s terms through
statutory interpretation to conclude that Congress is not granting the
Attorney General too much power.128 He lambasted the plurality’s
settlement on the feasibility standard as a “figment of the government’s
(very recent) imagination” because Section 20913(d) says nothing about
feasibility nor did the Department of Justice discuss feasibility in its
rulemaking.129 Even if SORNA directed the Attorney General to establish
a comprehensive national system, he disagreed with the plurality’s
interpretation of the word “comprehensive.”130 In Justice Gorsuch’s view,
SORNA’s wording gives the Attorney General unbridled power to
determine the rules for up to a half-million pre-Act offenders in the U.S.131
Additionally, Justice Gorsuch notes that various Attorneys General have
differing opinions on how SORNA should be applied to pre-Act

123. Id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
124. See id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider
the approach taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Today, a plurality of an eight-member Court endorses
this extraconstitutional arrangement but resolves nothing.”).
128. See id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality reimagines the terms of the statute before
us and insists there is nothing wrong with Congress handing off so much power to the Attorney
General.”). Justice Gorsuch also seemingly criticized Congress for passing the problem of how
SORNA would affect pre-Act offenders to the Attorney General to avoid “impos[ing] unpopular and
costly burdens on States and localities . . . .” Id. at 2131–32 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2145–46 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 2146 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing 3 Oxford English Dictionary 632 (2d ed.
1989) (discussing how the word “comprehensive” should properly be interpreted in respect to creating
a “comprehensive national system”)).
131. Id. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d), “The Attorney General shall have the authority to . . . prescribe rules for the
registration of any [pre-Act offender].”).
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offenders.132 As a result, he charges the fate of pre-Act offenders is
constantly in limbo as SORNA’s application to pre-Act offenders is subject
to change at the pleasure of the current Attorney General.133
Justice Gorsuch not only took issue with the nondelegation doctrine as
applied in Gundy, but he also challenged the Court’s approach to
nondelegation as a whole.134
Recognizing the Court “must call foul when constitutional lines are
crossed,” Justice Gorsuch questioned what an appropriate nondelegation
test should look like.135 Though the government structure is established
on the principle of separation of powers, Justice Gorsuch does acknowledge
permissible acts of delegation.136 However, he argues as the administrative
state has grown, the “intelligible principle” test became grossly
misunderstood and misused.137
In his view, the intelligible principle remark in J.W. Hampton was just
another way to state the traditional rule that Congress may delegate to the
executive branch to act as a fact-finder and fill in gaps for a controlling
general policy enacted by Congress.138 Instead of echoing the traditional
rule, the phrase was isolated and eventually displaced prior Court
rationale.139 While it has been several decades since the Court has held a
statute improperly delegated power without an intelligible principle,
132. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
133. See id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (detailing how different Attorneys General apply SORNA
to pre-Act offenders as they come into office).
134. Justice Gorsuch began his argument by discussing the founders’ commitment to establish
a government where rulemaking authority rested on the consent of the people through their
representatives in Congress. Central to the system of government is the separation of powers, which
ensures the consent of the people to rulemaking authority is only exercised by those duly elected as
their representatives in Congress. See id. at 2133–35 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing the founders’
intent to create a government of separate powers which he argues is not reflected in the Court’s modern
nondelegation approach).
135. Id. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
136. First, he acknowledges that after Congress makes the policy decision regulating private
conduct, it may refer to the executive branch to “fill up the details,” so long as Congress’s guidance is
followed. Id. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Second, after promulgating rules that govern private
conduct, Congress may leave the application of the rules to executive fact-finding. Id. (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). Finally, executive and judicial branches may be assigned non-legislative responsibilities by
Congress when the legislative authority overlaps with similar authority that the Constitution also vests
in another branch of government. Id. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 2138–40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“This mutated version of the ‘intelligible
principle’ remark has no basis in . . . the Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it
was plucked.”).
138. Id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2139–40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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Justice Gorsuch highlights the Court’s ability to regulate Congress’s
attempts to delegate power using different doctrines.140
Justice Gorsuch states three questions must be asked to determine
whether a statute provides a true intelligible principle: “Does the statute
assign to the executive only the responsibility to make factual findings?
Does it set forth the facts that the executive must consider and the criteria
against which to measure them? And most importantly, did Congress, and
not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgments?”141 While SORNA
fails to satisfy an intelligible principle standard in his view, Justice Gorsuch
is adamant that applying separation of powers does not determine policy
outcomes, but instead provides procedural protections for individual
liberties.142 Even though the Gundy Court declined to reevaluate the
nondelegation standard, Justice Gorsuch remains hopeful that, in the future,
with a full panel, the Court will ensure that Congress may obtain
“considerable assistance from the executive branch” while upholding the
separation of powers and ensuring individual liberties.143 While Gundy lost
his appeal with the plurality and concurring votes, he launched a last attempt
to change the outcome with a hearing in front of a full Court.
D. A Plea for Rehearing
A ruling from the Supreme Court is not necessarily the end of the case as
the parties may petition for a rehearing “within 25 days . . . of the judgment
or decision.”144 A petition for rehearing should “state the grounds briefly
and distinctly” and will only be granted if “a majority of the Court, [agrees]
at the instance of” one who votes in the majority or concurrence.145
Herman Gundy timely filed a petition for rehearing requesting all nine

140. For example, under the major question’s doctrine, the Court has been unwilling to let an
agency fill in statutory gaps when the statutory scheme’s central issue deals with a question of great
political or economic significance. Additionally, Justice Gorsuch notes how it would be easy to reframe
a nondelegation challenge as a void-for-vagueness challenge by asserting the act in question does not
contain definite and precise standards for determining whether the will of Congress was followed. Id.
at 2141–42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is a procedural guarantee that requires
Congress to assemble a social consensus before choosing our nation’s course on policy questions like
those implicated by SORNA.”).
143. Id. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
144. SUP. CT. R. 44.1.
145. Id.
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members of the Court decide his case.146
In his petition, Gundy argued that the decision of the Court was
essentially a tie of an equally divided eight-member court.147 He asserts a
rehearing is proper when it appears likely that a majority of the Court may
be persuaded one way or the other upon rehearing—especially “when a new
Justice . . . can break a tie.”148 Gundy equates the outcome in his case to a
tie—four justices in favor of SORNA without reservation and four justices
expressing skepticism—which should be broken by a full nine-member
court.149
However, this is not a well-drawn comparison. While Justice Alito stated
he would support the Court’s reconsideration of the nondelegation
approach,150 it is improper to lump Justice Alito’s concurrence in with the
dissent to create a “tie.”151 The dissent finds the provision in SORNA is
an unconstitutional delegation of power,152 while Justice Alito states “it
would be freakish to single out” this SORNA provision to reconsider the
nondelegation approach.153 Since Justice Alito favors a reconsideration of
the nondelegation approach, but did not think it is was appropriate with the
SORNA provision at issue, it is unlikely that he supported a rehearing in the
case. Therefore, it comes as no surprise the Court denied Gundy’s petition
for rehearing after it was relisted for conference several times154 and a final
judgment of the case was issued.155
It is worth noting that perhaps Justice Alito’s concurrence was also a
strategic move on his part.156 Though we will never know, this is likely part
146. After Justice Kennedy’s retirement at the time of oral argument, the Court had a temporary
vacancy. Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court four days after it heard oral argument in the case. Petition
for Rehearing at 1–2, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17–6086), 2019 WL 3202508, at *1–4.
147. Id. at *3.
148. Id. (quoting EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 15.6(a) at 816
(9th ed. 2007)).
149. Id. at *4.
150. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring).
151. See id. at 2131 (showing Gundy was decided by a plurality opinion).
152. Id. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring).
154. See John Elwood, Relist Watch, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 19, 2019, 2:39 PM), https://www.
scotusblog.com/2019/11/relist-watch-154/ [https://perma.cc/72JW-KXWM] (cataloging the dates
that Gundy’s petition for rehearing was relisted for conference).
155. Gundy v. United States, SCOTUS BLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
gundy-v-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/9AGJ-Y5KM].
156. Perhaps Justice Alito chose to concur only in judgment because if he sided with the dissent,
a 4-4 tie would have resulted in leaving the lower court’s decision in place and changing nothing. In a
4-4 tie, no opinion of the Court is written, which also means no dissenting opinions. Maybe
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of the reason the petition was denied. Moreover, the Court’s long-held
custom that a new justice—“that is, those who did not participate in the
original decision”—should not vote on a petition for rehearing.157 This is
likely in an attempt to prohibit the new justice from influencing a case
decided before his or her arrival to the Court. As in prior petitions for a
rehearing, this custom was followed, and Justice Kavanaugh took no part in
the petitions’ consideration.158 As discussed in a later section, it is
interesting to imagine how this case might have been decided had
Justice Kavanagh participated. For the time being, the intelligible principle
is the standard by which federal courts determine nondelegation challenges.
E. A Divided Court
The Court agreed on one thing in Gundy—Article I of the Constitution
prohibits the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies.
Nevertheless, the deep division between the Justices comes from where and
how to draw the line of what is “legislative power.”159 Such a division from
the Court will have lingering effects.
Justice Alito purposefully chose to concur so that Justice Gorsuch could write his dissent calling for a
reconsideration of the nondelegation approach. After all, it is Justice Gorsuch’s dissent that advocated
for reinvigorating the nondelegation debate. Along with Justice Alito’s welcoming future challenges
to the doctrine, none of this would have occurred had Justice Alito voted with the dissent.
157. Brian De Vito, Comment, When U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Are Not Final: An Examination
of the Rehearing Rule and the Court’s Application of it in Kennedy v. Louisiana, SETON HALL L. 17 (2010),
https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=student_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/HN8V-4BU9] [hereinafter De Vito, Examination of the Rehearing Rule] (citing
EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 816–17 (9th ed. 2007)).
158. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130.
159. While the Justices have failed to coalesce on when or how to draw a nondelegation line,
many others have articulated their approach to the nondelegation issue. Professor Schoenbrod says
the critical question to determine permissible delegations is whether the statute sets out rules or goals.
To him, the statute must set out rules of conduct and not just a set of goals for the executive to work
towards. Congress cannot merely announce ambition for the executive to seek; the Constitution
demands to specify how and to what extend the executive should realize the ambition. To him, a “rules
statute” is enough to determine permissible delegations, therefore qualifying as valid legislation. Gary
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 372–73 (2002) (citing David Schoenbrod,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 181–89 (1993)). Professor Redish proposed a “political commitment” approach to
nondelegation issues. Since lawmakers are the People’s agents in Congress, he proposes that statutes
must contain a meaningful political commitment level. Statutes that do not make such a commitment
should be considered as a simple mandate to the Executive Branch to create policy. A court can
determine whether a statute announces a political commitment by ascertaining if the statute is more
likely to inform voters about their representative’s position based on whether she voted for or against
the act. Id. at 374–75 (citing Martin H. Redish, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE
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In precedential fashion, the case turned on a narrow construction of the
statutory scheme at issue to seemingly avoid an unconstitutional delegation
issue. While stare decisis mandates the narrow construction of the statutory
scheme, such an approach is not without strong criticism.160 Though the
Court has never second-guessed Congress regarding the degree of policy
judgment left to agencies, the narrow construction given to statutory
schemes heightens the level of deference to the point of always ascertaining
an intelligible principle even when a challenged provision, like
Section 20913(d), contains zero boundary language.
Justices Kagan and Gorsuch share “a fundamental disagreement . . . on
how to operationalize nondelegation as a matter of constitutional
doctrine.”161 The plurality seeks to maintain the status quo of the
deferential intelligible principle while the dissent favors a set of more
formalized rules for future dealing with administrative law to create a more
robust distinction between fact-finding and determining elements of policy
within executive agencies.
Though Justice Gorsuch articulated a powerful dissent in Gundy, what
difference does it make? Dissenters are the “losers,” so why do many
consider his dissent to be so important?

136–37 (1995)); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, If Angels Were to Govern: The Need for Pragmatic
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 453–56 (1991); see also Brief for the Pacific
Legal Foundation, supra note 9, at 19–22 (advocating the Court adopt void for vagueness standards in
its application and evaluation of the nondelegation doctrine).
160. Narrow construction of a statutory scheme may be worthy of strong condemnation on
multiple fronts. First, by “narrow[ly] [construing] a statute by rewriting it” using legislative history and
purpose, the Court “threatens to unsettle the legislative choice implicit in adopting a broadly worded
statute.” Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion, supra note 5, at 175 (quoting John F. Manning, The
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 228 (2000)). There is a fine line
between statutory interpretation and statutory rewriting. While a court must engage in interpretation
to fully ascertain the meaning of a statute, a court can just as easily impute the background of the statute
to conform with its predetermined “interpretation.” Second, some criticize constitutional avoidance
as creating tension with the Chevron doctrine. Chevron “reasoned that Congress [might] enact openended statutes” because the federal agencies tasked with enforcing the statutes possess greater expertise
in for interpreting and administering the statute. Chevron’s approach shows the Court’s support for
deference to administrative agencies when the agencies are implementing a broad statute. Yet, when
evaluating constraints on delegations of power in broad statutes, the Court engages in a narrow
construction of statute for nondelegation purposes. Id. at 176 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)). Such an approach with the nondelegation doctrine
contradicts the approach mandated by the Chevron doctrine because an agency seeks deference by
asking for a broad interpretation of a statute yet nondelegation mandates a narrow construction.
161. Id. at 167.
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F. What Purpose Do Dissents Provide?
Historically, judicial dissents serve as a protest by the losing side as they
spar with the majority or plurality’s rationale.162 Perhaps dissents serve a
greater function than just a paper protest. For example, the careful crafting
of a dissent creates an intellectual exchange that often enhances the quality
of court opinions.163 Opinions of the Court are not always as coherent and
complete as they appear, and dissents serve as a spotlight on the shaky or
unclear reasoning of the Court as Justices seek to create the ideal
precedential rationale for lower courts.164
An essential role dissents play is to “push[] the reasoning of future cases”
closer to the rationale of the dissenter’s view.165 A dissenter can accomplish
this by questioning elements of the majority’s or plurality’s rationale and
advocating a sounder approach to the issue.166 The law is shaped by new
understandings that a dissent contributes to as the dissenter seeks to clarify
differing rationales to create a clearer result.167 As dissents question the
Court’s opinion, the exchange of ideas often clarifies and helps develop the
law.
When it comes to plurality opinions, dissents are often considered by
lower court judges while attempting to determine which rationale should
carry precedential effect.168 This is where Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is likely
to have the most impact. The intelligible principle remains the standard that
courts use to evaluate nondelegation challenges; however, the dissent is
likely to cause others to question whether the current intelligible principle is
the best approach.
Justice Gorsuch criticized the intelligible principle as too weak while
favoring delegation that allows another branch to fill up a statute’s
details.169 Though differing on the degree of deference afforded to
statutory delegation, the plurality and dissent converge on the same
fundamental analysis as both assess the boundaries to cabin executive
162. Randall T. Shepard, Notable Dissents in State Constitutional Cases: What Can Dissents Teach Us?,
68 ALB. L. REV. 337, 339 (2005).
163. Id. at 338.
164. Id. at 340.
165. Id. at 342–43.
166. Id. at 343.
167. Id. at 347–48.
168. See Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint,
69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 808–18 (2017) (discussing three different ways lower court judges can determine
the precedential force of a plurality opinion).
169. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2143 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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discretion.170 It is Justice Gorsuch’s advocation for more robust delegation
requirements that is likely to shape the future of administrative law as courts
encounter more nondelegation cases, perhaps due in part to Justice Alito’s
calling for such challenges.171
In calling out the plurality’s constitutional fouls, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent
sparked a conversation on how nondelegation should look in the future.
Either Congress or the courts can narrow the scope of delegated power.
Naturally, a lower court may find a delegation issue if the judge shares a
similar view with Justice Gorsuch. The number of judges with similar views
in the federal judiciary is likely growing thanks to the current presidential
administration.
As President Trump continues to appoint new federal judges, the federal
judiciary may soon contain a majority of judges who, like Justice Gorsuch,
favor strong separation of powers and a more robust nondelegation
doctrine. As a result, perhaps a future approach to nondelegation will look
a lot more formalized, as Justice Gorsuch promotes.
IV. A CHANGING FEDERAL JUDICIARY
The authority vested in President Trump via expressed enumerations in
the Constitution can be categorized as: martial,172 diplomatic,173
executive,174 legislative,175 and judicial.176 President Trump’s ability to
shape the federal judiciary will leave his mark on American law long after he
is no longer president.177 The President’s appointment power allows him
to “legitimately attempt to influence the outcome of cases in ways that agree

170. Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion, supra note 5, at 168.
171. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
172. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (stating the president of the United States is the
Commander in Chief of the United States military forces).
173. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (stating the president of the United States shall receive
ambassadors and public ministers).
174. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (stating the president of the United States is vested with
executive power).
175. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (stating the president of the United States shall report the State
of the Union to Congress from time to time).
176. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating the president of the United States shall have power to
appoint judges to the Supreme Court).
177. See Stacy Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial Legacy, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 20,
33–34 (2019) (“Trump’s judicial legacy is likely to be felt for generation to come and will be difficult
to reverse over the next several successive presidential administrations.”).
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with [his] political views.”178 While on the campaign trail, before Trump
became president, he promised to nominate conservative judges picked in
coordination with the Federalist Society.179 The Federalist Society brands
itself as:
[A] group of conservatives and libertarians . . . founded on the principles . . .
that the separation of governmental powers is central to [the] Constitution,
and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what
the law is, not what it should be.180

Of course, the President’s nominees must be approved before taking the
bench,181 but with a Republican-controlled Senate that has clearly not been
an issue.182
President Trump has appointed three jurists to the Supreme Court—
Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett—all of whom were suggested to
the President by the Federalist Society.183 Having been recommended by
the Federalist Society, it is safe to say these Justices strongly support the
separation of powers and the Constitution.184 Justice Gorsuch’s view of
the law did not bring much change to the Court as he replaced the late178. Quinn W. Crowley, Sticks, Stones, and So-Called Judges: Why the Era of Trump Necessitates
Revisiting Presidential Influence on the Courts, 94 IND. L.J. SUPP. 13, 16 (2018) [hereinafter Crowley, Sticks,
Stones, and So-Called Judges] (citing Stephen M. Engle, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE
COURT: OPPOSITION POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL POWER 323 (2011)).
179. Ian Millhiser, What President Trump Has Done to the Courts, Explained, VOX (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/9/20962980/trump-supreme-court-federal-judg
es [https://perma.cc/F35M-XPCR]; see also Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the Conservative
Counterrevolution, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1698, 1704–05 (2018) (discussing the list put together with
the help of the Federalist Society and released by then-candidate Trump, which consisted of twentyone potential Supreme Court nominees to replace the late Justice Scalia). Such action is not unusual
though, as presidents do not have personal knowledge of specific nominees and therefore reach out
for advisors and external sources for recommendation. Crowley, Sticks, Stones, and So-Called Judges, supra
note 177, at 28 (citing Lee Epstein et al., The Increasing Importance of Ideology in the Nomination and
Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 609, 611 (2008)).
180. Southworth, supra note 179, at 1715.
181. See Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump and Federal Bench Diversity, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 400, 403 (2018) (discussing the roles the Senate and other departments and organizations play
in determining whether the nominee should be allowed to take the bench).
182. Id. at 413.
183. Southworth, supra note 179, at 1715; Ben Schreckinger, ‘She’s Been Groomed for this Moment’:
Amy Barrett’s Supreme Court Preparation Began Early, POLITICO (Sept. 20, 2020, 10:24 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/20/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-419219 [https://
perma.cc/3HPX-R8XH].
184. Southworth, supra note 179, at 1713.
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Justice Scalia, an original sponsor and member of the Federalist Society, a
man with whom he shared many of the same viewpoints.185
President Trump’s appointment of Justice Kavanaugh, a hardline
conservative, has changed the dynamic of the Court as he replaced
Justice Kennedy, a moderate conservative.186 Moreover, the President’s
appointment of Justice Barrett, another hardline conservative, to fill the seat
left by late-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a liberal icon187 and notorious
judicial activist,188 solidified a conservative majority on the Court.189
These appointments pushed the Court further to the right as these
conservative jurists, with life tenure on the Court,190 are young and will
remain on the Court shaping the law long after President Trump leaves
office. Though when Gundy’s case was argued before the Court, the Court
had yet to move further right.191
A. A Missing Justice
It is important to note that Justice Kavanaugh had not yet taken
his seat on the Court at the time of the Gundy decision and therefore played
Before taking his seat on the Court,
no role in the case.192
Justice Kavanaugh’s work shows a jurist who takes seriously separation of
powers and favors a constrained ability for executive agencies to regulate

185. Id.
186. Millhiser, supra note 179; see also Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial Legacy, supra note 177,
at 22 (2019) (stating there was an ideological shift in the Supreme Court with the retirement of
Justice Kennedy).
187. Lisa Hirshman, Book Excerpt: Sisters in Law: How Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg Went to the Supreme Court and Changed the World, 40 HARBINGER 69, 70, 72–73 (2015).
188. Keith E. Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The Roberts Court and the
Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2219, 2220 (2014).
189. Seung Min Kim, Senate Confirms Barrett to Supreme Court, Cementing Its Conservative Majority,
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020, 8:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/
senate-court-barrett-trump/2020/10/26/df76c07e-1789-11eb-befb-8864259bd2d8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/TCA7-U5EP].
190. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 (stating that judges on the Supreme Court and inferior courts
hold their position “during good behavior”).
191. Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: How the Roberts Court Could Alter the Administrative State,
ABA J., http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-the-roberts-court-could-alter-theadministrative-state [https://perma.cc/4MBF-24ND].
192. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019). President Trump nominated
Justice Kavanaugh to the Court to fill the seat by retiring Justice Kennedy, but at the time of Gundy the
Senate had not yet confirmed Justice Kavanaugh. Southworth, supra note 179, at 1705.
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broadly.193 The addition of Justice Kavanaugh to the bench caused
commentators to see a new direction for administrative law coming from
the Court.194 Like Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh’s record shows he
typically urges less judicial deference to federal administrative agencies’
decisions.195
Recently, Justice Kavanaugh concurred in a denial of certiorari in a
petition that raised the same statutory interpretation issue the Court
addressed in Gundy.196 Certiorari was denied because the Gundy Court
already answered the question.
Nevertheless, Justice Kavanaugh
acknowledged: “Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s
nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further
consideration in future cases.”197 This shows Justice Kavanaugh silently
questions the current doctrine because if he agreed with the current
approach, he would not find that it warrants further consideration. Perhaps
his concurrence is like Justice Alito’s in that it welcomes future delegation
challenges by announcing his willingness to question the Court’s approach
should another delegation question come before the Court.198 If
Justice Kavanaugh participated in the Gundy decision, the outcome might
have been different as all signs point to his favoring a strong application of
the nondelegation doctrine like Justice Gorsuch.199
193. Christopher Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of Powers, SCOTUS
BLOG (July 26, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-administrative-

law-and-separation-of-powers/ [https://perma.cc/4EYW-LE2J].
194. See Chemerinsky, supra note 191 (“With Kavanaugh on the bench, it is easy to see five
justices who will be willing to revive the nondelegation doctrine and bring about a dramatic change in
administrative law.”); see also Yoo & Phillips, supra note 8 (discussing how the current administrative
state does not comport with the vision of the founders and how the addition of Justice Kavanaugh to
the Court may result in the Court reigning in the administrative state).
195. Chemerinsky, supra note 191.
196. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
197. Id.
198. Chemerinsky, supra note 191.
199. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Kavanaugh served as a judge on
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals—the court which hears the most administrative law cases in the
United States. During his twelve years on the bench for the D.C. Circuit, he heard over 300 cases
which clearly show he is a jurist committed to separation of powers like Justice Gorsuch. He advocates
for reading the precise wording of constitutional text while being mindful of its history and tradition.
In doing so, he believes it ensures each branch stays constrained by its enumerated powers and
prohibits infringement upon other branches while protecting individual liberty. Judge Kavanagh and the
Constitution, SENATE RPC (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/judgekavanaugh-and-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/5HBT-FXKC]. Having heard over 300 cases, one
can see Justice Kavanaugh’s commitment to separation of powers in his writings from the court. See,
e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 855 F.3d 381, 419 (2017) (Kavanagh, J.,

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/7

28

Pfrang Olvera: Gundy v. United States

2021]

COMMENT

669

B. Justice Barrett on Nondelegation
Unlike Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett’s views on the administrative
state—namely nondelegation—remain relatively unknown.200 This is
partly due to Justice Kavanaugh’s serving on the D.C. Circuit before his
nomination, the court which most contributes to administrative law;201 in
contrast, Justice Barrett served on the Seventh Circuit before her
nomination. Nevertheless, she is an originalist like the late-Justice Scalia, a
mentor for whom she clerked, and was a member of the Federalist Society,
an organization that emphasizes the importance of the nondelegation
principle.202
Although Justice Barrett’s opinions are limited, she has acknowledged
exceptions to the nondelegation doctrine exist.203 She has also stated “the
notoriously lax ‘intelligible principle’ test reflects the Court’s conclusion that
the decision of how to carry out routine social and economic policy belongs
almost entirely to Congress.”204 This indicates Justice Barrett may be
willing to revisit the nondelegation doctrine in limited settings, but may not
partake in a total revision like Justice Gorsuch advocates for his in Gundy
dissent. Regardless, Justice Barrett’s approach to the administrative state
and nondelegation is somewhat inconsequential as she will only add to a
majority if she shares her colleagues’ views on the matter.
The Court seemingly has the power to change the nondelegation doctrine
to a more formalized approach with at least a five-member majority. The
position of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Thomas are
known because of the dissent in Gundy. Justice Kavanaugh is likely to
support the same effort. Furthermore, Justice Alito made it clear in his
Gundy concurrence that he is open to reevaluating nondelegation. The
dissenting) (explaining the president does not have free standing authority to write rules and only may
act pursuant to grants of authority from Congress); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
537 F.3d 667, 688 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting) (discussing the importance of separation of powers
that the founders so cautiously established).
200. Shannon Osaka, Amy Coney Barrett’s Confirmation Could Revive This Hidden Doctrine—
and Derail Climate Action, GRIST (Oct. 26, 2020), https://grist.org/politics/this-hidden-doctrine-couldstymie-climate-action-under-the-new-supreme-court-with-amy-coney-barrett/ [https://perma.cc/3F
JG-V297] [hereinafter Osaka, Derail Climate Action].
201. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Special Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 90 GEO.
L.J. 779, 781 (2002).
202. Osaka, Derail Climate Action, supra note 200.
203. See Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 317 (2014)
(“[T]he Suspension Clause stands as an exception to the nondelegation doctrine, which emphasizes the
extremely broad leeway that Congress enjoys in assigning responsibilities to the Executive Branch.”).
204. Id. at 318.
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Court likely has a majority supporting a more formal approach to
nondelegation, with the ability to tailor administrative law the next time the
issue is before the Court.
With some Justices hopeful for another nondelegation challenge, the
nondelegation doctrine may soon find itself reinvigorated to its former 1935
glory.205 With former Vice President Joseph Biden’s election to the
Presidency,206 President Trump will not fill any more Supreme Court seats.
Although President Biden may prevent a reinvigorated nondelegation
doctrine from coming to fruition.207 Yet, to get to the Court, a case must
first start in the lower courts, another area where President Trump has made
a significant impact.
C. The Lower Federal Courts
President Trump’s biggest impact on the federal judiciary is greatly felt in
the lower courts as he inherited an unusually large number of federal judge
vacancies.208 Continuing to work in lockstep with the Federalist Society,
President Trump set records by filling roughly 25% of the federal judiciary
with his nominees within his first two years in office.209 President Trump
appointed more federal appellate judges than any other president in
history—appointing forty-eight circuit court judges—in less than three
years.210
205. Yoo & Phillips, supra note 8.
206. Scott Detrow & Asma Khalid, Biden Wins Presidency, According to AP, Edging Trump in
Turbulent Race, NPR (Nov. 7, 2020, 11:26 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/07/928803493/bidenwins-presidency-according-to-ap-edging-trump-in-turbulent-race [https://perma.cc/B929-Y94B].
207. There is much speculation to whether President Biden will attempt to undo the
conservative stronghold on the federal judiciary secured under former-President Trump. Many
speculate that President Biden, along with the help of Congress, may attempt to stack the Supreme
Court to obtain a liberal majority or strip the federal courts of jurisdiction on particular issues.
Christopher K. Sprigman, A Constitutional Weapon for Biden to Vanquish Trump’s Army of Judges,
THE SOAPBOX (Aug. 20, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/158992/biden-trump-supremecourt-2020-jurisdiction-stripping [https://perma.cc/89QY-FRPE]. This would certainly be an
unprecedented change to the modern federal judiciary that may rob the judicial branch of its apolitical
and co-equal status. Such a dramatic change in an attempt to liberalize the federal judiciary may leave
the nondelegation doctrine in exile for another eighty-five years.
208. Hawkins, supra note 176, at 29.
209. Id.
210. Id.; see also Millhiser, supra note 178 (“At [a similar point] point in the Obama presidency,
Obama had appointed only 24 court of appeals judges, meaning that Trump is appointing appellate
judges twice as fast as Obama. At a similar point in their presidencies, President George W. Bush had
filled only 30 seats on the federal appellate bench; President Clinton, 27; President George H.W. Bush,
31; and President Reagan, 23.”).
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The record-setting amount in this short period is significant as one in
every four federal circuit court of appeals judge is now a Trump
appointee,211 leading to “flipping” multiple circuit courts with Republicanappointed majorities.212 President Trump has made quick use of his
appointment powers to change the circuit courts’ judicial philosophy. This
is significant because, as Justice Sotomayor once quipped, “the [circuit]
court of appeals is where policy is made.”213 While courts do not “make”
policy, they certainly shape the law as many laws are broad and unclear. As
the judicial philosophy of the circuit courts becomes more conservative with
President Trump’s appointments, their philosophy will be reflected in the
law’s interpretation.
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Gundy is a welcome invitation to challenge
broader statutes as unconstitutional delegations of power to restore the
proper separation of powers articulated in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent.214
Emboldened by Gundy, such challenges are likely to soon end up in a circuit
court of appeals. While the Supreme Court is the court of last resort for a
select few, a circuit court of appeals is where many cases end. In 2018, the
Supreme Court heard only seventy-six cases, while the twelve circuit courts
of appeals had 49,363 filings in total.215 This means for thousands of cases
a year, the judges on the circuit court are the final arbiters of an issue. As
the court’s dynamics change with the addition of judges possessing
conservative judicial philosophy, circuit courts will likely come to different
conclusions on the same issue—like nondelegation.
Conservative judicial philosophy favors a strict construction of the
Constitution, adhering to the framers’ original intent.216 As such, since the
211. Colby Itkowitz, 1 in Every 4 Circuit Court Judges Is Now a Trump Appointee, WASH. POST
(Dec. 21, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/one-in-every-four-circuit-co
urt-judges-is-now-a-trump-appointee/2019/12/21/d6fa1e98-2336-11ea-bed5-880264cc91a9_story.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/2UR8-KVNQ].
212. See Tim Ryan, Trump Flips Another Circuit to Majority of GOP Appointees, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERV. (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/trump-flips-another-circuit-to-majoritygop-appointees/ [https://perma.cc/58JF-DJ2C] (stating the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of appeals now have a majority of Republican appointed judges after President Trump’s
nominees were confirmed).
213. Millhiser, supra note 178.
214. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority
of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would
support that effort.”).
215. Itkowitz, supra note 211.
216. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism, 10 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 275 (1987).
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Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, conservative judges
strictly construe this provision, limiting the scope of the legislature’s ability
to delegate. Judges with a stronger conservative judicial approach, like the
ones appointed by President Trump, are likely to share views like
Justice Gorsuch and favor a more formalized approach to nondelegation.
The Supreme Court often takes cases to resolve circuit court splits—the
circumstance when two or more circuit courts arrive at a different
conclusion on the same issue.217 If the same statute was challenged as an
unconstitutional delegation of power in separate circuit courts and the
courts differed on their application of the nondelegation doctrine, we may
see another nondelegation case before the Supreme Court in the next few
years. With President Trump’s influence on how the lower courts will
interpret the law, it is likely the difference in interoperative approaches to
nondelegation are growing and will lead to circuit splits.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh
seem ready to address another nondelegation issue and tailor the law’s
approach to strengthen the constitutional command of separation of
powers.
However, suppose the nondelegation doctrine was strengthened,
requiring statutes to contain a more formalized delegation of power, as
Justice Gorsuch suggests. Thus, forcing Congress, not an executive agency,
to make fundamental policy judgments. In that case, it is likely to create
tension with the current Administrative Procedure Act.
V. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND NONDELEGATION
The current expansive and ever-growing administrative state is founded
on two documents—the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure
Act.218 Regulations promulgated by government agencies created within
the discretion delegated to them by Congress play an everyday role in
American lives.219 Strikingly, by the end of 2016, the Code of Federal
Regulations contained tens of thousands of rules totaling more than 175,000

217. Circuit Split, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/circuit_split
[https://perma.cc/XNQ7-VML5].
218. Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion, supra note 5, at 166.
219. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121,
122 (2016) (mentioning everyday situations in which Americans may encounter regulation promulgated
by a federal agency).
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pages.220 In 2016 alone, with power delegated to them by Congress, federal
administrative agencies filled over 95,000 pages of the Federal Register with
proposed rules, notices, and over 3,800 final rules promulgated by
agencies—an increase from the 3,410 final rules promulgated in 2015.221
In contrast, during that same two year period, Congress only passed 329
public laws taking up a modest, by comparison, 3,036 pages in the Statutes at
Large.222 This illustrates the enormous amount of delegation from
Congress to federal agencies. The People’s representatives give unelected
bureaucrats the power to promulgate thousands of rules with the force of
law to dictate Americans’ daily lives.
“Congress is the constitutional body of the administrative state.”223 As
Justice Gorsuch recognized in his dissent, Congress often delegates to avoid
political responsibility for unpopular decisions. Delegation through broad
statutes allows legislators to avoid confronting “hard political decisions
which underlie legislative precision.”224 This avoidance corrupts a
fundamental principle of nondelegation—accountability.225 As delegation
increases, political accountability decreases.226 Such corruption of
fundamental principles has left some to declare that administrative
regulations are unlawful.227
Even if delegation is appropriate, and it seems like it almost always is at
the federal level, Congress then imposes additional requirements an agency

220. Christopher J. Walker, Restoring Congress’s Role in the Modern Administrative State, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2018) (citing CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST.,
TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY
STATE 19–20 (2017)), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20Thousand%C20Commandments%
202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TDC-3JPR]).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1102.
223. Robert C. Sarvis, Legislative Delegation and Two Conceptions of the Legislative Power, 4 PIERCE L.
REV. 317, 346 (2006).
224. George Bunn et al., No Regulation Without Representation: Would Judicial Enforcement of a Stricter
Nondelegation Doctrine Limit Administrative Lawmaking?, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 341, 371 (1983) (quoting
Nelson Rosenbaum, Statutory Structure and Policy Implementation: The Case of Wetlands Legislation, 8 POL’Y
STUDIES J. 575, 576 (1980)).
225. There are three fundamental principle of nondelegation: “democratic accountability for
legislators and the President, inter-branch accountability for executive and administrative action, and
limitation on government power through checks-and-balances.” Martin Edwards, Who’s Exercising
What Power: Toward a Judicially-Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 65 (2016).
226. Id.
227. PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 493 (2014).
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must fulfill before it can promulgate a rule.228 Congress has created the
monstrous administrative state and subsequently works to keep it from
going rogue. As a side effect of Congress’s delegations, it imposes on itself
the responsibility to create additional requirements to establish safeguards
and ensure agencies stay within their allotted discretion. To do so, Congress
passed the Administrative Procedure Act to establish limitations and create
consistencies for federal agency actions.229
A. The Administrative Procedure Act
Rulemaking is a federal agency’s ability to “specify, clarify, and refine
Congress’s work-product—in short, to finish the task of legislating.”230
The APA is designed to establish procedural limits to cabin threats to
individual liberty associated with the administrative state’s growth.231 For
an Act regulating the 3,000-plus final rules promulgated last year, one can
imagine how detailed and complicated the Act can be.
The APA applies to all federal agencies in general and therefore does not
contain specific provisions applicable to either executive or independent
regulatory agencies.232 Under the APA, the distinction is in the procedure
required by the different grants of legislative authority to make either an
informal or formal rule.233 A “rule” made under the APA is defined
broadly as any “agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy”
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency.234
Informal rulemaking requires three steps: (1) an agency must give notice
to potentially interested parties by publishing proposed rules in the Federal
228. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551–59 (1946) (placing requirements
on federal agencies that must be fulfilled prior to implementing rules).
229. Scott F. Johnson, Administrative Agencies: A Comparison of New Hampshire and Federal Agencies’
History, Structure and Rulemaking Requirements, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 435, 438 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson,
Administrative Agencies].
230. Cornelius M. Kerwin, Administrative Law and Regulation: Making Rules: An Introduction,
Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1995)
[hereinafter Kerwin, Administrative Law and Regulation].
231. Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. (SUPP. ISSUE) 615, 623 (Fall 2006) [hereinafter Custos, The Rulemaking Power].
232. For the purpose of this paper it is not consequential to distinguish between executive or
independent agencies. The conclusion of this paper would apply to either and, therefore, will make no
distinction and will simply refer to a general “federal agency.” Id. at 624.
233. Id. (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1946)).
234. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1946).
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Register; (2) an agency must give interested parties the opportunity to respond
to the proposed rule through written and oral means; and (3) after allowing
time for comment and gathering additional information, the agency must
publish a statement explaining the final form thirty days before the rule’s
effective date.235 Informal rulemaking is generally satisfied by giving people
a reasonable opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.236 The
quasi-legislative nature of these requirements allows for public input on the
promulgation of rules that will affect their everyday lives, but it does not
mandate the agency adopt into the final rule the positions advanced by
public comments.237
Rules are typically promulgated under informal requirements, but
occasionally formal rulemaking can be mandated under sections 556 and
557. Formal rulemaking only applies “when rules are required by statute to
be made on record after an opportunity for agency hearing.”238 The formal
rulemaking procedure is trial-like, as the agency must provide a party the
opportunity to present evidence and conduct cross-examination in a hearing
presided over by an agency official or administrative law judge.239 The need
for the rule must be supported by substantial evidence on the record.240
However, the Supreme Court interpreted formal rulemaking narrowly,
holding it is only required when Congress mandates the rulemaking
proceeding be “on the record.”241 Congress rarely imposes this rulemaking
standard on agencies, so the formal rulemaking process is essentially
nonexistent in administrative law.242
Though formal procedures are rarely required, Congress occasionally
imposes additional requirements in tandem with informal rulemaking.
Hybrid rulemaking is the requirement of procedures above what is imposed
by the informal rulemaking standards.243 Hybrid rulemaking lends itself to
235. Id. at § 553(a)-(e).
236. Custos, The Rulemaking Power, supra note 231, at 624; Johnson, supra note 229, at 446.
237. Johnson, supra note 229, at 449.
238. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556–57 (describing when formal rulemaking may be necessary).
239. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 3 (2017).
240. Comment, Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act Through Rulemaking:
The Implications of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
148, 155–56 (1977) [hereinafter Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act].
241. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 3 (2017) (citing United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 251 (1973)).
242. Id.
243. Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act, supra note 240, at 150.
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greater flexibility than formal rulemaking and provides for greater public
Some of the hybrid
participation than informal rulemaking.244
requirements placed on agencies before they can act include: developing
information on the paperwork burden generated by the rules, reducing
regulatory burden on small business, holding hearings, or conducting
environmental impact statements.245 This is all necessary because Congress
chooses to pass on bare-bones legislation to federal agencies to be
implemented with their discretion.246 Federal agencies are bloated with
discretion.
B. Will a Revived Nondelegation Doctrine Reduce Agency Bloat?
Federal regulations cost Americans roughly $1.9 trillion in 2016.247 This
is an exuberant amount of money spent based on the recommendations of
unelected officials. Agency bloat is amplified by the requirements imposed
on them by the APA to ensure these quasi-legislative bodies do not abuse
their rulemaking power. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
perhaps one of the most bloated federal agencies as it has expanded its scope
over time to create some of the broadest delegations with no repercussion—
particularly with the Clean Air Act.248
To illustrate hybrid rulemaking in action, from 2010 to 2017, federal
agencies conducted a total of 1,161 environmental impact statements.249
The average timeframe for each impact statement was four years and five
months.250 This is just one example of the hundreds of hybrid rulemaking
rules imposed on federal agencies under the APA, which consumes a lot of
time and money. If nondelegation were revived with a more formalized

244. Id.
245. Custos, The Rulemaking Power, supra note 231, at 628.
246. See id. at 619 (“Moreover, the widespread of rulemaking does not necessar[ily] derive from
a clear congressional intent.”); see also Cost and Burden of Federal Regulations Reach $1.9 Trillion,
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (May 31, 2017), https://cei.org/content/costs-and-burden-federalregulations-reach-19-trillion [https://perma.cc/GHA4-UWX6] (reporting for every law enacted last
year, eighteen rules were issued).
247. Cost and Burden of Federal Regulations Reach $1.9 Trillion, supra note 246.
248. The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act grant incredibly broad discretion regarding
technology and admission standards. William McGarth & Jeffery Jay, The Nondelegation and Enviro Regs,
Post-Gundy, LAW360 (July 18, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1179508/thenondelegation-doctrine-and-enviro-regs-post-gundy [https://perma.cc/8FM7-VNX9].
249. Press Release, Executive Office of the President Council on Environmental Quality,
Environmental Impact Statements Timelines (Dec. 14, 2018) (on file with author).
250. Id.
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approach like Justice Gorsuch’s,251 a tension would likely be created with
the APA because the need for all the rulemaking procedures would be
reduced as delegation lessens.
If the purpose of the APA is to give guidance in specifying and clarifying
Congress’s work product, and if delegation lessened and Congress had to
make the fundamental policy judgments, federal agencies can shift from
spending so much time clarifying Congress’s mandates to actually
implementing them. That is not to say Congress must specify every detail,
which might slow down the system even more. However, if statutes
contained more detail than stating to implement it in “the public interest,”
it would likely make rulemaking more efficient and less costly.252 The less
detail an agency has to fill in, the more efficient it will be in implementing a
congressional act.253 Perhaps the number and length of environmental
impact statements would not be necessary.
The purpose of a rulemaking hearing is to allow interested persons to
shape the law governing their everyday lives.254 Political accountability
comes into play because the people have already spoken through the
election of their congressional representatives who are the ones tasked with
representing people’s interests in regulations. If the people must again
advocate on their own, then what exactly do congresspeople do? With a
stronger nondelegation doctrine, Congress will have to limit agency
authority to just findings of fact to implement Congress’s policy judgments.
By reducing delegation, there will be less need to monitor agencies to keep
them from going rogue, as Congress would further detail the policy to be
implemented. Thus, the APA’s purpose would be diminished in part while
still serving as a vital check on further congressional mandate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The constitutionally mandated nondelegation doctrine is dead—at least
for the time being. Nondelegation is not about shrinking the size of the
251. Recall the three questions Justice Gorsuch stated should be asked: “Does the statute assign
to the executive only the responsibility to make factual findings? Does it set forth the facts that the
executive must consider and the criteria against which to measure them? And . . . did Congress, and
not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgements?” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
252. Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act, supra note 240, at 178 (citing Env’t. Def.
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 348 F. Supp 916, 927 (N.D. Miss 1972), aff’d, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.
1974)).
253. Id. at 150.
254. Johnson, Administrative Agencies, supra note 229, at 449.
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administrative state. It is about enforcing the Constitution. Our founders
sought to protect individual liberty by granting all legislative power to
Congress, but that has given way to political expediency. The uncontested
truth is all legislative power is vested in Congress; however, the struggle over
the past eighty-four years centers on what is considered legislative. Gundy is
the most recent showing of this struggle. Delegation is necessary to keep
the government from getting bogged down in minutia, but Congress must
first establish a complete policy framework for administrative agencies to
fill in.
In narrowly construing a challenged statute under nondelegation, the
Court created a tradition of straining to read a statutory scheme to avoid a
delegation issue. This is what Justice Gorsuch seeks to change with his
reasoning in Gundy. Many see his dissent as the beginning of a
transformation in administrative law.
President Trump’s judicial
appointments have created a more conservative federal judiciary, which as a
whole likely support stronger requirements for delegations from Congress.
With a majority of Justices now on the Court who support reevaluating
nondelegation, it is likely the intelligible principle may give way to a more
formalized approach.
Until then, the APA will continue to guide agency discretion as federal
bureaucrats promulgate thousands of rules a year. While the different types
of rulemaking requirements seek to ensure agency discretion is cabined
within appropriate limits, the limits are essentially limitless when statutes are
vaguely worded. However, if agency delegation is limited by a revived
doctrine, the APA’s purpose would be diminished in part and rulemaking
would be more efficient, as the full policy detail would have to come from
Congress.
The Court must call foul when necessary to restore the separation of
powers, protect individual liberty, and keep delegation from running riot.
Stand by and watch, over the next few years—administrative law in the
United States is going to change.
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